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kitchen debates, that, while it was the carrier of economic, scientific, and every other kind of progress, it could do little to achieve that progress except bash its head against the double wall of the workers-and-peasants' state: the workers and peasants themselves, who couldn't care less about scientific, social, etc. progress, and the bureaucracy professing to represent and care for the interests of the workers and peasants but in actual fact caring for nothing but its own well-being - progress of any kind was definitely not among its priorities. "Stability" was, and under Brezhnev it had all the "stability" it wanted. It practically wallowed in "stability." This explains the fact that while self-avowed dissidents with a political agenda, people who wrote for underground publications, staged puny demonstrations and went to labor camps or mental homes for their sins were few and far between, practically the whole of the intelligentsia was tarred with the brush of dissent. Moreover, it wasn't just vague, general discontent with things as they were but a clear realization of the conditions under which the intelligentsia could play a role it wanted to play - the conditions under which Western society operated. Unfortunately for Russia and for itself, when the time for action came, the intelligentsia wanted too much too soon, not least perhaps because its aspirations had been thwarted for too long. It had eaten too much humble pie, listening to harangues about the triumph of proletarian dictatorship in a "single, separately taken country" and seeing the mess into which the country was sinking under that dictatorship. This last observation, however, is but parenthetic comment. What I'm really trying to say here is this. Although the West mostly noticed and discussed the actions of the more prominent dissidents of the Brezhnev era like Alexander Solzhenitsyn, Andrei Sakharov, Vladimir Bukovsky, and others of that type, much more important for the country's future development under Gorbachev and later was the mood of the massive intelligentsia Fronde as described here. it could not even be called a movement, for under Brezhnev there was no political movement outside the Party that would be worth the name (just as there was no political movement worth the name inside the Party). It was merely a common mood. a common understanding of certain things, and a common readiness to act in a certain way. given half a chance. It was this general mood and intentions that would make the Gorbachev perestroika possible, not the conspicuous dissidents of the Brezhnev era who were given a hero's welcome each as they drifted one by one to the West. The mood I'm describing here is that of shestidesyatniki "people of the sixties." The term needs some explaining. Originally, it referred to Russia's progressive social figures of the 1860s and then became the self-appellation of the intelligentsia that took the Khrushchev Thaw and denunciation of the "personality cult" to heart as promises of Soviet socialism's evolution toward a more human form (the term was apparently first used in this sense by the writer and critic Stanislav Rassadin). The shestidesyatniki matured in ideological battles between the liberal "stout monthly" Novy mir (New World) and the weekly Literaturnaya gazeta (Literary Gazette), on the one hand, and the conservative, or neo-Stalinist "fatty" Oktyabr (October) and the Soviet excuse for a glossy magazine Ogonyok (Little Light),
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